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THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
AND KOSOVO
Abraham D. Sofaer*
It is a privilege to participate in the war powers Symposium of
Loyola's 1999 Fritz B. Bums Lecture Series. The subject of the War
Powers Resolution (WPR)l and Kosovo is certainly important, deal-
ing as it does with the power over war. Yet, it is sadly true that the
WPR has become more of an embarrassment to the United States
than a meaningful description of how our three branches of govern-
ment should exercise their powers under the Constitution.
People feel very strongly about both aspects of our subject: the
war in Kosovo and whether it complied with the WPR or the Con-
stitution. I can say nothing positive about the way in which Presi-
dent Clinton's administration conducted the diplomacy leading up to
the war. The diplomatic performance of the United States and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a disaster. We
threatened Yugoslav President Milosevic with force if he failed to
sign the Rambouillet Accords.2 We promised the Kosovar Albanians
that we would use force to compel Yugoslavia to abide by the Ac-
* The Honorable Abraham D. Sofaer has had a distinguished career as
prosecutor, legal educator, federal judge, government official, and attorney in
private practice. From 1985 to 1990, Mr. Sofaer served as Legal Adviser to
the United States Department of State. In 1990, he was named the George P.
Shultz Distinguished Scholar and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute. He is
also Professor of Law (by Courtesy), Stanford Law School, and considered a
leading scholar in the area of the war powers. His book, War, Foreign Affairs
and Constitutional Power: The Origins, examines the early exercise of the
constitutional powers of Congress and the President to control the use of mili-
tary forces. Mr. Sofaer graduated from Yeshiva College and the NYU School
of Law. He served as Law Clerk for Judge J. Skelly Wright, United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., United States Supreme Court.
1. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1991).
2. See Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2000).
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cords if the Albanians signed them3 And then we bombed Yugosla-
via until it agreed to a significantly different agreement that excluded
demands that Milosevic rejected as unacceptable in the original pro-
posal.4 That kind of diplomacy violates Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter and reflects poorly on our country. But, ultimately,
I must concur with what Professor Kahn said here at the Symposium
that, at the end of the day, the Clinton administration was legally and
morally justified in acting to intervene in Kosovo. We had 800,000
people evicted from their homes by a racist murderer, who despite
having been indicted, unfortunately, is (at the time we speak) still
alive and running a country.7 So, I support the war in Kosovo and
believe that President Clinton acted consistently with the UN Char-
ter.
Congress has a role to play in any war, and even if the war in
Kosovo was justifiable under international law, it must also pass
muster under U.S. law. In general, I agree with Professor Kahn's
interpretation of what Congress can do, which is quite contrary to
what Representative Kucinich has indicated he believes. Congress
was never given the power to stop a war, especially one that it funds,
without doing anything (i.e., through inaction). Congress was given
the power over war by the Constitution, but it has to exercise that
power.8 It cannot allow-and indeed facilitate-a war and then try
to establish the claim that, because of legislation passed by a prior
Congress, the war became illegal after a certain duration.
Some claim that Kosovo was so out of line with what has hap-
pened in the history of our government that it should be regarded as
some new assertion of executive power.9 It should not. To begin
with, the Constitution has long been recognized not to require Con-
3. See id.
4. See id. (and other sources cited therein).
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (requiring that all member states refrain
from the threat or use of force).
6. See Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 LoY. L.A. L.
REV.[(PAGE #)] (2000).
7. See James Gerstenzang & Richard C. Paddock, U.S. Assails Kosovo
'Genocide, 'Hints at NATO Protectorate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at Al.
8. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 135, 140 (1948).
9. See generally Sofher, supra note 2 (discussing whether the United
States exercise of force in Kosovo had legal justifications).
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gress to "declare" war in order for a war to be legal.' 0 The first war
the United States fought after the ratification of the Constitution was
with France." It was called the "Quasi-War."' 2 Why? Because it
was undeclared.' 3 The Supreme Court explicitly upheld that Quasi-
War as lawful in a decision 200 years ago, despite the fact that it was
undeclared. 14 The Court held that the Quasi-War was lawful because
it was authorized by legislation.' 5 So, the issue we have here today
really boils down to the following question: Was the war in Kosovo
authorized by legislation or was it illegal because Congress failed to
indicate approval in the specific manner purportedly required by the
WPR?
The answer to the first part of the question must be based-as it
was in the Supreme Court's decision upholding the legality of the
Quasi-War--on the measures adopted by Congress on the subject.' 6
Each measure must be examined carefully and in its context to de-
termine whether, in light of controlling standards, congressional ap-
proval was effectively given.
Let us consider what happened. There was widespread publicity
and a lot of information and debate about the war in Kosovo, before
the war ever began. Many people in Congress and elsewhere noted
that Secretary of State Albright threatened force several times before
the U.S. government and NATO finally acted.' 7 In addition to the
public threats by the United States and NATO, Clinton administra-
tion officials testified in Congress about what they were doing and
about the measures they had caused, or attempted to cause, the UN
Security Council to adopt.' 8 Among these measures was Security
Council Resolution 1199, declaring the actions of Yugoslavia in
10. See generally ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); Abraham D. Sofaer, The
Power Over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 33 (1995) (arguing that the Constitu-
tion does not require rigid procedures in matters as risky as war).
11. See Sofaer, supra note 2, at 41.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37,40 (1800).
15. See id. at 39, 41-46.
16. See id.
17. See John K Bolton, Clinton's Bluster, VKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 8,
1999, at 14-15.
18. See id.
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Kosovo to be a threat to peace and security in the region.' 9 All this
information-and much more-was before Congress, as were NATO
pronouncements and the statements of President Clinton.
On March 23, 1999, the day before President Clinton approved
the use of force in Kosovo, the Senate adopted a resolution author-
izing "air operations and missile strikes" in cooperation with NATO
against Yugoslavia.20 On March 24, the same day the President
acted, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution supporting
U.S. armed forces "engaged in military operations against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia.",21 Different resolutions, yes, but both
supportive of military action after a full understanding of the relevant
facts. Then, on March 26, the President reported to Congress under
the WPR that he had authorized U.S. forces to join in "Operation Al-
lied Force., 22 This was in conjunction with NATO's decision in re-
sponse to Milosevic's effort to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians. The
decision expressly took into account the views and support of Con-
gress. Here was the President telling Congress: "I appreciate the
support of the Congress in this action. "24 Congress did nothing to
question, let alone challenge, this implicit characterization.
On April 7, the President sent an additional extensive report to
Congress, in which, among other things, he promised to continue the
war to the end.25 In his report, the President also said that the United
States was bombing Yugoslavia and would continue bombing until
victory was achieved. However, he did not know when the war
would end.26 In effect, the President was indicating both that he in-
tended to continue bombing until the war ended, and that the process
could take more than sixty days, a period beyond the limit set by
19. See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. ScoR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1199 (1998).
20. S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
21. H.R. Res. 130, 106th Cong. (1999).
22. See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Air
Strikes Against Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 35 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 527 (Mar. 26, 1999).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 528.
25. See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Air
Strikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 35
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 602 (Apr. 7, 1999).
26. See id.
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Congress under the WPR for a military action conducted without
specific, legislative approval.
27
On April 28, four votes took place in the House related to the
legality of the war in Kosovo.28 A declaration of war was defeated.2
The House was evenly divided on whether to reject or support Senate
Resolution 21.30 Then, the House passed a bill against the use of
ground troops, not against using troops in general, or planes, but
against ground troops.- Finally, one month later, on May 20, while
the bombing was still going on and before sixty days had run (i.e.,
while the WPR still implicitly authorized the President to act), both
houses of Congress passed a supplemental appropriation bill paying
for "Operation Allied Force," and stating that Congress desired a re-
port from the Department of Defense about the operation since its in-
ception on March 24.32 In this legislation, Congress authorized and
directed payment of billions of dollars to support the war.33
In the real world of legal responsibility, the measures adopted by
Congress clearly established its approval 34  But in the artificial
world that the WPR has attempted to create, these acts were not suf-
ficient to establish approval because Congress had not conferred ap-
proval in any law with a specific reference to the VPR, as 50 U.S.C.
§ 1547(a) requires.
The problem with the requirement of a specific reference to the
WPR in order for congressional approval to be established is that the
rule has absolutely no relationship to legal approval in any real-world
27. See id.; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
28. See 145 CoNG. REc. 2427 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See H.R 1569, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (1999).
32. See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
S. 1059, 106th Cong. (1999) (authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 2000
for military activities of the Department of Defense).
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Colleen R. Courtade, Annotation, Wghat Constitutes Policy or
Custom for Purposes of Determining Liability of Local Government Unit Un-
der42 US.C.S. § 1983-Modern Cases, 81 A.L.R. FED. 549 (1987) (collecting
and analyzing numerous federal cases as to how local governments are deter-
mined to be responsible entities in the context of claims of deprivation of fed-
erally guaranteed civil rights).
35. See 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a).
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context. Imagine, for example, how the courts would react to an ex-
culpatory claim by the leader of a Mafia family who attempted to
rely on an approval requirement analogous to that of the WPR. The
head of the Mafia family would, of course, love having such a rule to
govern the family's personal responsibility for its criminal activities.
Suppose that one of the family's chief lieutenants walks into the
Don's office and says: "Don, we are going to take care of the other
family. They have been giving us a lot of trouble, and we have to
act. I just sent some of the boys out to do the job. We are calling it
'Operation All in Our Family.' We will keep at it until the job is
done, however long it takes." The Don replies: "Oh, well, thanks
for telling me. I really cannot approve the operation under the family
rules, which call for explicit permission. But here is a resolution of
support for our boys out on the streets, and I wish them luck."
So, the lieutenant goes out on the streets and starts to "take care"
of business. The lieutenant is in the middle of the job when the
lieutenant comes back and says, "Don, I have a problem. I need
more money to pay for the operation. The other family is putting up
a big fight. We have to turn up the pressure." So, the Don says,
"Oh, well, you know, that is not a problem. We can pay for 'Opera-
tion All in Our Family'. But I still cannot give you an explicit reso-
lution. I am going to give you the money you need, the guns you
need, whatever, but do not say that I approved this under the family
rules. That would be wrong."
Silly? Indeed. That is my point. When the Don is indicted, the
Don has no legal defense. No university, no company, no leadership
of a university, no board of directors of a company, no chief execu-
tive officer-the list could go on and on-would ever be able to
avoid responsibility in such a situation. Once an organization-or an
individual--passes a resolution supporting the success of participants
in a project, and then in the middle of it agrees to pay for the project,
it becomes ridiculous to claim that the project was not approved
merely because a self-serving verbal formula of some sort was not
used.
That is what the WPR attempts to do, however. According to 50
U.S.C. § 1547(a), in order for approval to be established for a mili-
tary action, Congress must explicitly state in a law "that it is intended
to constitute specific statutory authorization" of the action under the
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WPR 3 6 This effort by one Congress to restrict the legal effect of the
actions of future Congresses is itself legally ineffective. The Su-
preme Court would likely avoid this issue on standing or other
grounds, as the lower courts have.37 But if the Court ever reaches the
question it will hold, instead, that authorization is authorization, and
that a legal conclusion cannot be defined by one Congress at one
point in time to exclude in all future cases all but one of its possible
forms.3' And what Congress did with regard to Kosovo is authoriza-
tion.39
Congress should repeal this aspect of the WVPR, if for no other
reason than its effect in encouraging legislative irresponsibility. It
gives Congress a way of saying that it did not approve something
that it not only tolerated, but also condoned and paid for. This is
definitely not the way to get Congress to take seriously its responsi-
bility to consider when and how the President and the nation should
use force. In fact, it also encourages executive irresponsibility, sug-
gesting to the President that what Congress does is irrelevant, and
that the President has the legal power to act freely, without constitu-
tional restraint. This is plain wrong and could lead some day to a se-
rious constitutional crisis.
These dangerous weaknesses in the WPR by no means require
its overall repeal. The WPR makes a lot of sense in two areas. First,
it requires the President to consult with Congress so that Congress is
36. See id.
37. See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 901 (D.D.C. 1982), aftid,
720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d
34, 35 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3741 (No. 99-1843) (holding that plaintiffs do not have
standing to raise the claims).
38. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1995); Julian N. Eule, Temporal
Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM.
B. FouND. REs. J. 379 (1987).
39. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971) (finding congressional authorization in support of military
operations in Southeast Asia based on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August
10, 1964, plus continuing appropriation bills providing billions of dollars); see
also DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 979 (1972) (holding that repeal by Congress of the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion on December 31, 1970, did not remove the congressional authorization
previously found sufficient in Orlando).
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appropriately informed in exercising its constitutional powers,40 and
so that the President is forced to explain the reasons for using force
in the absence of a declaration of war when introducing U.S. armed
forces.4' Second, the WPR is helpful in setting up a process by
which Congress can express its position, if it has something to say.42
Congress can undoubtedly stop the President from using force if
Congress acts in a definite and timely manner.43 Congress can even
force the President to act, with some possible exceptions.44 But the
WPR is ineffective insofar as it seeks to redefine the meaning of
authorization and it should be repealed in that regard.
What our government did in the Gulf War was as close to per-
fect as possible in terms of a joint, responsible use of the power over
war. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker mustered the sup-
port of most of the world, the UN Security Council, and then of
Congress.4  That is why, in part, the Gulf War was successful. Ar-
guably, it should have been continued a little longer, but it was very
successful to the extent that it isolated a Nazi-like regime and pre-
vented it from expanding its control throughout the Middle East.
Congress needs no phony legal definitions to control or support
the President. It needs only to act as it sees fit, but to allow the
President to lead if it is unable or unwilling to act. It should pass a
law that simply and cold-bloodedly tells the President: "Tell us what
you have done, what you are going to do, and why. We have set up a
voting process by which we will decide whether to support you, op-
pose you, or do nothing definitive. At the end of the day, what we do
or fail to do is what we will have to stand behind."
40. See 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
41. See id. § 1543.
42. See id. §§ 1541, 1544.
43. See generally Sofaer, supra note 10 (stating that Congress, not the
President, has the ultimate power over war).
44. See id. at 34.
45. See generally Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress,
the President, and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 640-55 (1993) (stat-
ing that the President worked hard to forge an international consensus on the
Gulf War Crisis and discussing Congress's approval of the use of force).
46. See id.; Louis Rene Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes: Allied
and Israeli Right Under International Law, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 41 (1993) (discussing that the crimes of the Baghdad regime were of the
gravest nature).
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President Clinton claimed he could act in Kosovo for sixty days
without any legislative approval. 47 That, I submit, is an unhealthy
constitutional situation. If Congress had rejected the supplemental
appropriation, the President would in fact have been acting uncon-
stitutionally and would in any event have soon run out of the means
to continue the war. These facts would have been clear if the WPR
had not been around to mislead.
47. See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Air
Strikes Against Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 35 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 527 (Mar. 26, 1999).
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